Film Policy and England: The Politics of Creativity by Dave, Paul
Film Policy and England: The Politics of Creativity 
Paul Dave 
 
This essay offers a discussion of policy and its relationship to film culture in Britain 
focusing primarily on the last twenty-five years, and concentrating exclusively on 
England. Necessarily a foreshortened overview, it nevertheless seeks to cover the 
recurring, general reference points in policy analysis, such as the opposition between 
commerce and culture; the relationship between state and ‘nation’; the wider cultural 
policy discourses within which film has taken its place, particularly that of the 
‘creative industries’ model (CI), and, lastly the constraining and enabling socio-
economic contexts within which film and cultural policy acquire their complexion in 
specific eras. This last emphasis, on social democratic and the neoliberal contexts, is 
designed to keep the political and cultural issues raised by policy developments 
foremost and to avoid the de-politicising lure of pragmatic ‘realism’ or critical 
timidity in assessing these developments. 
 
Patterns of Policy 
Historically British film policy has covered a range of different objectives which can 
be classified according to the distinctive as well as necessarily overlapping instances 
of the economic, cultural, social and political (Hill 2004). Whilst the coverage of the 
first three is familiar in the academic literature, perhaps the last tends to be given less 
attention. From the perspective of a left politics of film culture this is a pity. For 
instance, it is common for histories of British film policy to start in the 1920s with its 
key pieces of protectionist legislation affecting the economics of the industry in the 
face of Hollywood dominance, thus neglecting earlier legislation such as the 
Cinematograph Act of 1909. One of the effective but covert political expedients in 
this earlier act, the first licensing of premises with a view to audience safety in 
consideration of the fire hazards presented by early cellulose nitrate film stock, was to 
help smother the emergence of a proletarian counter public sphere constituted by the 
so-called ‘penny gaffs’ in areas such as East London with their high immigrant 
communities (Burrows 2004). Such moments help to remind us that policy combines 
precisely formulated forms of intervention (here local government licensing) along 
with that which is much harder to analyse and evaluate: currents of political and 
ideological pressure. The 1909 Act is the beginning of that stealthy form of ruling 
class vigilance over a popular cultural form felt to require unique and extra controls – 
such as local council approval over exhibition. Such concerns speak to a recognition 
of film’s potential political disruptiveness (the incitement to ‘disorder’). As Julian 
Petley sardonically notes, the licensing powers of local authorities survived the end of 
flammable film stock (Petley 2013). 
Whilst politically attentive to film, the state has nevertheless been keen to conform to 
a treasured national self-image: one of British democratic freedoms. This has 
historically necessitated maintaining the appearance of a distance between the state 
and regulation of the industry. Thus, Western Europe’s most heavily censored film 
culture has been characterized by the use of para-state, non-governmental institutions 
such as the British Board of Film Classification in order to exert discreet, ‘arm’s 
length’ political pressure in support of the status quo. The careful shadowing by the 
state of the radical cinema of the inter-war years is a good example of this vigilance 
(Petley 1986:44). This politically coercive face of the state is of course only one 
aspect of its engagement with film policy. Historically, interventions have sought to 
regulate the economics of the industry in support of commercial film production, and 
to achieve social aims: see for instance the support for the documentary movement 
under the Empire Marketing Board in the 1930s and under the Ministry of 
Information during WWII. As John Hill puts it, this distinctive strand of British film 
culture represented the “cultivation of film as a vehicle for information, instruction 
and the construction of citizenship” (Hill 2004: 33). To these older examples of social 
aims we can add the United Kingdom Film Council’s (UKFC) and its successor, the 
revamped British Film Institute’s (BFI), shared objectives of an ‘inclusive’ and 
‘diverse’ film culture (BFI 2012).  
Finally, historically there has been a distinctive cultural component to policy, one 
which as we will see has recently been expanded and transformed in importance, but 
which can be traced back to initiatives such as the setting up of the BFI in the 1930s 
with its mission to archive the national film culture and promote those aspects of film 
culture which were perceived to be in excess of its purely commercial qualities, 
including educational initiatives, the provision of forums for evaluative criticism, the 
fostering of wider distribution and exhibition outlets for distinctively cultural films 
from outside the national culture, and the small scale support of cultural film 
production (Nowell-Smith and Dupin 2012).  
Clearly the relationship between these different aspects of policy (economic, social 
and cultural) is historically mutable, however, this variability is not simply contingent 
on successive governmental agenda. One way of characterizing it over the post-war 
period would be in terms of the shift between social democratic and neoliberal state 
formations. The former attempted to manage the relationship between capitalism on 
the one hand, and social equality on the other, a concern which, as Jim McGuigan 
points out, expanded into the related project of fostering cultural inclusion and access 
(McGuigan 2004). By contrast, a tempting, but misleading view of neoliberalism 
would be to see it as the abandonment of social and cultural concerns to the 
indifference and philistinism of the market. Rather it has sought the incorporation of 
social and cultural policy objectives within a market which is reconfigured as their 
ideal medium for realization. To this extent the critical point of distinction between 
the two moments is the neoliberal rejection of the contradiction between capitalism 
and either social equality or cultural access, a contradiction which the social 
democratic moment had recognized as a given. 
On the level of cultural policy formations this shift between social democratic and 
neoliberal frameworks can be roughly mapped onto the difference between the post-
war ‘arts and culture’ paradigm (which accepted the need for cultural state subsidies 
because of the perceived likelihood of the market failing to provide for recognized 
cultural values) and that of the post 1980s ‘cultural and creative industries’ paradigms 
which conceptualised commerce and culture entering into new productive 
partnerships whereby culture was deemed to be less that which needed protecting 
from the market and more that which might flourish within it (Dickinson and Harvey 
2005). With a historical tidiness, Keynes himself was involved in the 
institutionalisation of the former immediately after the war; the creative and cultural 
industries moment is however more untidy in its periodisation. Thus, Thatcher’s early 
1980s pursuit of laissez-faire accepted an opposition between the market (which the 
state was to leave untouched), and ‘arts and culture’ provision (which might require 
some – reduced – assistance or patronage). But this kind of opposition was by no 
means typical of the mature neoliberal approach to cultural policy adopted by the 
Majorite Tories or New Labour in which the cultural instance was subject to an 
economic transvaluation which has had important results for film policy and the 
willingness of the state to actively engage with the film industry. Simply put, within 
the CI model, culture is viewed as a resource. Thus, in the contemporary ‘creative 
economy’, cultural policies rest upon economic justifications (neoliberal accountancy 
practices quantify the economic value of culture). Equally, in indication of the close 
co-operation and compatibility of the economic and cultural instances, economic 
policies can rest on cultural assumptions (for instance the UKFC’s Cultural Test of 
2007 which set cultural thresholds in exchange for film industry tax relief) (Hill 2012: 
337). 
With the advent of the Tory led coalition government of 2010 a largely settled pattern 
of policy appears to have emerged which dates back roughly to the early 90s. Before 
that time, in the early 1980s, commercial subsidies for the indigenous film industry 
were removed as Thatcher’s governments abolished older, protectionist styled 
interventions, including the Eady Levy (a redistribution of a proportion of box office 
takings to producers), the Quota Act (a requirement placed on exhibitors and 
distributors to handle a minimum percentage of British films), and the National Film 
Finance Corporation (providing loans for British producers). At the same time 
cultural film subsidy was maintained largely through the interventions of the Arts 
Council, Channel 4 (C4) and the BFI, the latter two responding to lobbying by the 
Association of Cinematographic and Television Technicians (ACTT), and the 
Independent Film-Makers’ Association (IFA). By such means pressure in support of a 
critical and public service view of film culture was sustained. By the early 90s, under 
John Major, help for the commercial film sector resumed in the form of tax relief and 
Lottery funding. From 2000 this arrangement was consolidated and rationalised 
through New Labour’s UKFC which also took on a cultural and social remit, 
rendering subordinate the BFI and placing an emphasis on the expansion of the 
regional sector to deliver a spectrum of policy goals. These covered a social inclusion 
agenda which sought to develop a wider social base for cinema going by means of 
distribution and exhibitions strategies, a pledge to encourage diversity in the 
workforce, along with training and educational initiatives, and a commitment to foster 
an identifiable sense of national film heritage. As John Newsinger argues, after 2010 
this basic mix was maintained, nevertheless, in the context of the coalition’s austerity 
drive there has been a weakening of the regional sector whilst, despite initial fears, 
support for the mainstream industry remains solid (Newsinger 2012). 
 
State and Nation 
Before we can evaluate these shifting relations between social, economic and cultural 
aspects of policy we need to consider the problematic historical relationship of the 
British ‘state’ to its ‘nation’. Generally, it has been recognized that states can struggle 
to effectively formulate national film policy. Limitations are imposed by the 
transnational or globalizing logic of mainstream cinema, and in particular by the 
dominant power of Hollywood. But equally, the desirability of an uncritical defence 
of a putatively national culture by the state is problematic given the dangers of the 
falsely socially homogenized, essentialised or mythified manifestations such national 
cultural formations can assume (Higson 2000, Wayne 2002). 
In the British case this situation contains a further complexity which can be summed 
up thus: the British state is historically strong whereas the ‘nation’ which is its object 
is neither unified nor, in the case of England strongly defined in terms of what many 
would view as authentic traditions of popular sovereignty (Gardiner 2012, Colley 
2014). This underlying problem, if unaddressed, can disturb contemporary 
discussions of the problem of defining an authentic (or ‘cultural’) national cinema for 
the purposes of policy intervention. For some such problems appear to relate to a 
general condition (Higson 2000). According to a commonplace of contemporary 
cultural theory this is the collision between an essentialised project of national 
identity and the necessary actuality of cultural hybridity which is especially acute in 
postmodern times. There is a danger that such arguments can act to conceal the 
historical peculiarities in this particular state/nation relationship. The conjunction of 
an Englishness which lacks “clarity about boundaries and identity” with a strong 
imperial state, represents such a peculiarity (Colley, 2014, 60 and Gardiner, 2012). 
Indeed the idea of a British ‘state-nation’, a reversal of the accepted formulation 
‘nation state’, emphasises this historical subordination. That is to say, this Englishness 
(the hegemonic core of a falsely homogenized Britishness) might be seen less as an 
‘expression of English arrogance’ and national presumption, and instead be viewed in 
terms of the longevity and dynamism of a strong centralised state projecting a 
capitalist culture of class and empire in order to offset the missing cultural yeast of 
popular sovereignty - what Linda Colley describes as a culture of “people-building” 
(Colley 60-1).  
As a context for policy measures this legacy is both a problem and an opportunity. 
Thus, in its historic hyper-visibility, the Englishness of British cinema is eminently 
exploitable. Indeed, the strength of ‘industrially’ defined British cinema (as opposed 
to a ‘culturally’ defined one) is dependent in important ways on this mythic and 
globally recognized culture of Englishness, with all its abstract, idealized and 
marketable characteristics (Westall and Gardiner 2013). This is a thoroughly 
profitable cultural resource that the British state seems happy to support through the 
agency of the UKFC and at global showcase events like the London Olympics 
(directed by Danny Boyle). The re-conceptualisation of culture as an economic 
resource to be exploited is an important part of the shift at the heart of the CI model of 
cultural policy. Here, the profitable projection of Englishness has its popular cultural 
face: Bean, Bond, Potter; its canonical literary tradition: Austen to Forster; its 
associated imperial kudos along with its fetishised class-system imagery; and finally 
its self-conscious investment in and studied exploitation of a precious historicity. All 
these aspects constitute what Andrew Higson refers to as a “surprisingly resilient 
panoply of Englishness” (Higson 2010). Note these same features are emphasised in 
Higson’s success story account of English cinema in its New Labour/UKFC moment.  
It might be argued then that policy aimed fundamentally at supporting industrially 
British filmmaking is simultaneously, amongst other things, helping to support a 
regressive culturally English cinema. Indeed, it is open to doubt, as Newsinger 
observes, whether such policy meaningfully supports a national industry, as opposed 
say, to say a “cheap outsourced Hollywood assembly plant” with generous tax breaks 
soliciting ‘inward investment’ for the UK styled as a global ‘creative hub’ (2012 139). 
Higson, however, argues that an evolving and renewed national cinema is emerging 
out of such policies after what he sees as the near collapse of the early 1980s (2010 
63). Placing emphasis on the benefits of the Cultural Test of 2007 he also points to the 
irony that its more substantive national cultural features (for instance the categories of 
‘content’ and ‘cultural contribution’) were imposed on New Labour by the 
transnational agency of the European Commission. Equally, he highlights the fact that 
national film culture renewal can be seen so clearly in the work of directors who seek 
to ‘creatively’ re-interpret it and whose reference points are clearly transnational, such 
as Gurinder Chadha (2010: 63). This account then places significant emphasis on the 
dimension of contemporary international exchanges and flows, both cultural and 
economic. 
 
Commerce and Culture: Cultural Industries to Creative Industries 
Claire Monk describes Higson’s work cited above on contemporary British cinema 
since the 1990s as “consensus case studies of Englishness-for-export”; and “academic 
capitulation to market agendas” (Monk 2001 461). And it does seem that Higson’s 
emphasis confirms the diminishing significance afforded to the older sense of a 
contradiction between commerce and culture. David Puttnam’s statement “strong 
cultural resistance can best be built on the basis of a firm understanding of the 
realities of the marketplace” sums up this shift neatly (Miller 2000: 44). This is a 
development with a complex genealogy going back to the 1980s when attempts were 
made through metropolitan socialism (including the initiatives of the Greater London 
Council) to explore the opposition between commerce and culture in a socially and 
culturally progressive direction. The cultural industries strategy sought to overcome 
the art vs. popular culture dualism through a critique of the traditional left’s suspicion 
of market-based forms of popular culture. This was with a view to supporting forms 
of independent cultural entrepreneurialism and previously marginalized social voices. 
As Margaret Dickinson and Sylvia Harvey put it: “The intention was to promote a 
new kind of popular culture led neither by remote multinationals nor by the limited 
cultural tastes of the local dominant class”(Dickinson and Harvey 2005 424). 
The argument that Hollywood’s popular cultural influence can be viewed as a 
potentially beneficial or critical aspect of ‘cinema in Britain’ because of its demotic 
energies and the contrast it offers with an indigenous class-bound offering, fits with 
this ‘cultural industries’ policy moment (Hill 1992, Nowell-Smith 1985). The latter’s 
critique of an older ‘arts and culture’ agenda, as say manifested in the support of the 
independent cinema movement of the 1960s and 1970s, was aimed at combating the 
problem that such cultural formations often displayed a middle class bias in terms of 
participation and thus had inbuilt tendency to rely on exclusionary forms of cultural 
capital, not to mention a relative neglect of the problem of race and racism (Dickinson 
54).  
The policies of the GLC were preoccupied with ideas of cultural democracy. 
However, from the late 1990s, under New Labour, this critical and politically radical 
edge to policy was subject to a significant transformation within the discourse of 
‘creativity’ which translated the “reconciliatory logic” of New Labour’s “social 
market” idea into policy interventions (Neelands and Choe 2010 288-9).  
‘Reconciliatory’ because the social market (or Third Way) suggests that social (or 
cultural) objectives can be achieved painlessly via market means (2010 289). Thus, 
the social and cultural ‘exclusions’ of the market are lost to sight. The discourse of 
‘creativity’ then represents a particular articulation of the commerce/culture 
opposition, with a marked insistence on a common core of activity/energy. As the 
UKFC put it: “Film is a complex combination of industry and culture. Common to 
both are creativity and commerce” (Newsinger 2009). If the idea of creativity 
attempts to establish a fundamental identity, however complex, of commerce and 
culture, it nevertheless remains the case, as I will argue below, that it ultimately 
subordinates the hopes of a progressive cultural policy to an overriding concern with 
satisfying dominant industrial interests. And this despite the persistence, in the case of 
film policy, of social and cultural aims of inclusion and diversity – aims which in the 
assessment of many have been weakly developed (Hill 2004, Dickinson and Harvey 
2005, Newsinger 2009). 
 
Regional Film Policy 
Newsinger’s work helps to show that it was in the regions during the New Labour 
period that the CI model of policy was most vigorously developed and also where the 
task of supporting a culturally ‘national’ cinema was principally located - in tacit 
recognition that the commercial mainstream could not sustain such ambitions 
(Newsinger 2009). The objective was to build up an industrial infrastructure upon 
which to sustain a wide range indigenous film cultural activity. Public subsidy was 
directed through Regional Screen Agencies (RSAs) to small commercially oriented 
independent companies (SMEs) for the purpose of encouraging training, outside 
investment and a network of facilities linked up to local broadcasters. This hive of 
regional ‘creative’ activity was then presented as the point at which cultural and 
economic policy converged generating a virtuous cycle of  ‘sustainable’ film culture.  
It is important to note two things at this point. Firstly, that which in the CI model’s 
application to regional policy appears to fit with the neoliberal ideology of the 
‘creative’ spirit of the market – the emphasis on the small scale, lean, competitive, 
energetically entrepreneurial, and of course successful – is actually dependent on 
public funds. Indeed, under this regime, references to public ‘subsidy’ tend to be 
replaced by terms such as ‘investment’ (Hill 2010). RSAs, like the UKFC itself, were 
private companies operating with public money, but with limited public 
accountability, and they preferred to use the language of commerce. 
The second point to note is that the flow of public money into private hands, overseen 
by industry ‘experts’, fits with the general eclipsing of the idea of the importance of 
publicly debatable notions of public interest, separable from trade interests – or rather, 
it indicates the democratic deficit in the CI model of policy making. This is a point 
made effectively by Dickinson and Harvey about the UKFC era, and it is one that 
remains relevant in the present BFI dispensation. Just as private companies benefit 
from public money disbursed by bureaucratic and professionalized experts on the 
regional level, so on the national level regular policy reviews are conducted by 
‘consultation’ which necessary limits democratic discussion in the name of efficiency 
and superior industry know-how (Dickinson and Harvey 2005). 
As Newsinger argues, the CI model has effectively depoliticized the regional film 
sectors, replacing the idea of film as a cultural practice exemplified by the older 
regional workshop model which we will consider below. One area where this problem 
in regional policy can be examined is that of the short film which boomed under the 
UKFC. The digital short represents a good example of the proposed painless 
convergence of cultural, social and economic policy objectives within the CI 
framework. What Newsinger’s research illustrates, however, is how it poorly served 
the objectives of ‘access’ and ‘diversity’, social and cultural goals which it was 
deemed an ideal vehicle for (Newsinger 2009). Indeed, the intention to include groups 
traditionally marginalized from film culture found itself channeled into the 
‘institutionalized individualism’ promoted by the empowered regional agencies 
(McGuigan 2004). The short film presented a form whose relatively rapid fabrication 
and usefulness as an industry entry ‘stepping stone’ militated against the complex 
collective productive context and more erratic temporal rhythms of the residual 
regional workshop culture which arguably was more successful in achieving headway 
with objectives such as diversity and access. 
Despite the rhetoric of a convergence of policy objectives, the economic one of 
maintaining mainstream commercial objectives remained dominant. Indeed, a key 
aspect of the CI model has been the fostering of a skilled, regionally based labour 
pool. Much of what appears to be regional ‘regeneration’ has been established by an 
expansion of the sector based on the entrenching of neoliberal labour market practices 
such as casualisation. Such practices fit with what critics call the New International 
Division of Cultural Labour whereby more pliant, less protected labour markets are 
prepared for multinationals and local businesses seeking to reduce labour costs 
(Miller 1999 38). 
The vigour of this CI entrepreneurial dynamism coincided with the defeat and decline 
of the older model of the regional workshops. Fundamentally, the workshop principle 
recognized the exclusionary logics of the commercial mainstream on levels of 
access/participation and reception/response, logics that remain difficult to 
meaningfully evade by the voluntarism or ‘institutionalised individualism’ of the CI 
model. Along with the stress on collective production came an emphasis on 
democratic control of projects and a different conception of ‘creativity’, not reducible, 
as in the regional digital shorts boom, to eye-catching stylization or even ‘innovation’ 
around genre, but seeking to engage with a range of forms (experimental, narrative 
and documentary) and offering sustained attention to the politics of form. Equally, the 
workshops operated according to contrasting temporal rhythms which, given their 
detachment from commercial motives (profit), enabled what Peter Thomas calls 
“durational and immersive” projects embedded in specific communities. Such 
practices are opposed to the commodified logic of speed and market distinctiveness in 
which, for example, short films grab attention as a prelude to feature film production 
and career advancement (Thomas 2011 11).  
In earlier periods, such as the 1930s and 1960s, a process of reflection and making-do 
was a feature of politicized film culture in what might be called its incubational stage, 
and as Dickinson argues, the workshop movement as a whole has strong filiations 
with these traditions (1999 31). To take one example, Amber Film Collective from the 
north-east sought both to engage in such reflective activity (over time re-working 
social realist traditions in its output), and to retain as much as possible its autonomy 
through mixed survival strategies, including controlled engagement with the market 
as well as workshop grants via C4 and other funding bodies. 
There has always been in such oppositional projects from which the workshops 
emerged an aspect of what has become known as DIY counter-culture. According to 
George McKay this is an informal, collectively organized culture, in which productive 
activities are characterized by lending, giving, helping out without the necessary 
expectation of commercial return/re-numeration (Mckay 1997). Dickinson is referring 
to the same phenomenon when she cites the “unofficial cottage industry” of 1960s 
independent film culture relying on practices of mutual borrowing, assistance, 
working for free on projects where there was no attempt to acquire funding and an 
implicit denial of market values. This was the pre-existing, enabling tradition for the 
first workshops (1999 30-1).  
Of course, it might be argued that the labour market casualisation which is at the heart 
of the CI model has increasingly cynically adopted and deformed this DIY ethic to the 
advantage of commercial motives through practices such as ‘unpaid internships’. But 
equally, it is interesting to see how this DIY culture re-emerges in explanations of the 
significance of the work of Shane Meadows, one of the key figures of the 
regionalization of film production under the CI model. Meadows is a determinedly 
regional filmmaker whose work helps to us to get a dialectical view of the 
relationship of policy to left critical ambitions for regional and national film culture, a 
view which captures such policies’ consequences both negative and positive, intended 
and unintended. Also, Meadow’s example will help us to elicit the outlines and 
possibilities of alternative frameworks for policy. 
 
The Case of Meadows 
The first thing to consider is the problem of origins. Read retrospectively, Meadows’ 
critical and commercial success which was consolidated in the era of the CI model 
suggests a mythic vindication of voluntarist entrepreneurialism. To ironise the title of 
his first feature, this is the Meadows of manic, unflagging, prolific energies, an 
exemplar perhaps of the nightmarish neoliberal 24/7 work culture discussed by 
Jonathan Crary (Crary 2013). However, Meadows short film exercises (1994-7) 
cannot be reduced to a sequence of ‘calling cards’, ‘stepping stones’ or ‘rungs on the 
ladder’ helping him climb out of obscurity. Instead, it might well be argued that the 
aura of his origins (“a filmmaker who came from nowhere” as Kate Ogborn puts it), 
conceals some of the residual strengths of the older, workshop paradigm which in 
practice overlapped with the emergent CI model during this period, before the latter 
was operationally formalized post-1997/2000 by New Labour’s UKFC (Ogborn in 
Newsinger 2013 25). 
It was through a strong pre-existing, local context of community access, central to 
workshop tradition and mediated in Meadows case through the Nottingham based 
workshop Intermedia, that the early shorts were made. When Meadows refers to the 
state giving him his break (money saved from his social security payments funding 
his early efforts), our attention is drawn to the Headstart scheme ran by Intermedia in 
the 1990s which offered training and access to equipment for the unemployed 
(Meadows in Newsinger 2009). Such schemes tend to put emphasis on the social 
aspect of policy (and the accounts Meadows gives of his experiences at Intermedia 
indicate the community based/pastoral ethic in operation at the time) (Wilson 2013 
913). However, it is equally true that Meadows remained wary of the independent, 
theoretically informed leftist film culture which represented the core of the regional 
workshop movement during the late 1970s and 1980s - he refers to it disparagingly as 
“elite” “condescending” and “exclusive” and this is a judgement which speaks to the 
realities of the gradients of class and cultural capital in predominantly middle class 
independent film cultures of the time (Meadows in Wilson 2013 912). 
Notwithstanding this, the fact remains that the local and residual influence of the 
workshop moment helped Meadows and his collaborators to explore a specific 
working class culture of youth. Newsinger makes the important point that much of 
this activity was reliant on a strong local DIY counter-culture (Newsinger 2009). 
Success in short films brought Meadows firmly into the orbit of the CI model, 
however the results of this encounter are complex, contradictory and dialectically 
entangled. On the one hand there was the danger of the mainstreaming of regional 
material, or what Mike Wayne refers to as the pressure to adapt authentic 
regional/national representations to transnational logics, a development clearest in the 
comically inflected regionalism of the social realist tradition during this period 
(Wayne 2002, 2006). A film like Once Upon a Time in the Midlands (2002) in its 
mainstream casting practices (running counter to Meadows’ habitual approach before 
and after) is in some ways indicative of this trend whereby the regional policies of the 
CI model acted to drain away indisputably ‘homemade’ or locally specific cultural 
energies into product for larger markets. 
Equally, however, it remains true, as Newsinger observes, that regional policy under 
the CI model has offered provincial filmmakers’ creative freedom and autonomy from 
London (an explicit concern of Meadows). In this respect Warp Films stands as a 
representative and tutelary institution for the established director, just as Intermedia 
did for the beginner. Warp sits in a network of regional funding institutions (co-
ordinated, during the UKFC period, by EM Media, the Regional Screen Agency for 
the area), and has distribution partners (including C4 for broadcasting); it is integrated 
horizontally (through interests in music and publishing), and it is connected inter-
regionally (with co-production links to the north-eastern RSA Screen Yorkshire). This 
enables both access to private and public funds at the same time as giving its directors 
a degree of local autonomy. Dead Man’s Shoes (2004) and This is England (2006) - 
perhaps the two most critically successful of Meadows’ films - were produced by 
Warp according to its principles of reduced budgets within ‘generic niches’ 
(Newsinger 2009). Under such circumstances Meadows’ reconnected with his 
preferred methods, including the use of non-professional actors and improvised 
production practices. 
These two films display the complexity of Meadows’s work under the CI model as it 
reaches beyond the commercialized bleaching-out of regional culture that some have 
detected in Once Upon a Time in the Midlands and offers a revision of the established 
conventions of what has historically been the dominant form of regional film 
production, social realism. The key to this complexity lies in the engagement with 
popular culture. In the earlier ‘cultural industries’ model of policy, popular culture, 
with its relationship to mainstream markets, was recognised as a significant 
preference for working class audiences seeking to evade the suffocating elitism of 
British national culture. Hollywood has clearly been important in Meadows’ 
development as a filmmaker. But for Newsinger, his interest in popular genres 
suggests a historical contrast between the older workshop model and the 
depoliticizing effects of the CI model – as he puts it, Meadows’ reference point is 
‘popular culture not cultural politics’ (Newsinger 2009). Whilst Meadows is by no 
means an explicitly political filmmaker it is less straightforward to claim that the 
inclusion of popular genres within social realism necessarily depoliticizes the work. 
For Newsinger the compromise with ‘escapism’ or the capitulation to ‘entertainment’ 
takes Meadows over the traditionally designated discursive boundary within which 
the ‘moral realism’ of social realism maintains itself (Newsinger 2009). However, we 
might view Meadows’ use of popular culture (the humour and farce as well as the 
generic self-consciousness) differently. The aesthetic extremism available in popular 
cultural genres, for instance the use of elements of horror, the gangster and western 
film, black comedy and satire in Dead Man’s Shoes, helps construct a form of tragic 
realism which in turn facilitates an exploration of the neoliberal politics of class with 
its ‘law and order grand guignol’ (Dave 2011).  
Finally, we need to consider an issue closely connected to the affect generated in 
Meadows’ work around ‘sociality’. This is a quality which is also related to the 
importance of popular cultural form, in this case comedy. The pleasure of sociality is 
clearly central to Meadows’ work, and provides a further explanation of the apparent 
enigma of his ‘origins’ which avoids drawing on the competitive individualism of 
neoliberal ideology that is at the heart the CI model. Critics recognize a fundamental 
continuity in Meadows’ films around the apparent ‘belief in community’ along with 
his persistent attention to the ‘sociality of the group’ (Monk 1999, Newsinger 2009, 
Dave 2011). This recurring feature appears as a thematic; as a foregrounded element 
of style (the centrality of improvisation) and as a production practice (DIY with its 
valorization of mutuality and collectivity not just as methods of oppositional cultural 
practice but as pleasurable ends in their own right). And, of course, it can be pushed 
back further into the popular cultural experiences of specific, youthful, working class 
communities. Indeed this overdetermination of the motif of sociality gives Meadow’s 
work that peculiarly allegorical, self-referential transparency whereby the diegetic and 
extra-diegetic realms appear call to each other. Thus, to take one example, the 
exuberant improvisation in the films is clearly rooted in Meadows’ casts’ collective 
experiences of popular culture. As a technique, it accesses commonly held popular 
cultural repertoires (horror and comedy for instance) in order to act out the social 
realist dramas. Popular culture then is not so much an escape from the themes of the 
films so much as means of collectively exploring and keeping them close to common 
cultural experiences. 
But we can push this further and argue that this aspect of Meadows’s work suggests a 
grounding in particular cultural values which have a political significance, even if this 
political significance is not explicitly formulated as such. That is to say, this 
thoroughgoing interest in the collective – the enjoyment of its potential inclusiveness 
and enabling mutuality, the ‘sense of belonging and access to the social group’ that is 
projected in so many of the films and which seems to persist even in the most extreme 
and destructive of situations depicted, is reminiscent of what Raymond Williams 
intended with his normative principle of a ‘common culture’ (Newsinger 2009 and 
Williams 1989). The latter has its origins in working class history with its co-
operative institutions and their ethic of solidarity (Eagleton 2000 120, Dave 2011). 
However, what Williams meant by a common culture was neither to be restricted to 
any ‘panacea of proletarian culture’, nor to designate a culture of uniformity 
(Eagleton 2000 121). ‘Common’ referred to a culture that was to be understood as 
common in form, but not in content. A common culture is one in which the principles 
of cultural democracy through which cultural pluralism or diversity can flourish, rest 
on politically securing the ‘means of community’ (Williams 1984). In other words, a 
common culture implies a politics which vigorously acts against, rather than 
rhetorically deprecates, material structures of exclusion from cultural participation. 
’Sociality’ is the residual (and anticipatory) trace of that common culture. But the 
latter can only become the context of policy through what would be a fundamental re-
alignment: a moving away from cultural politics (whose problem is that it legitimizes 
the nebulous liberalism of cultural difference which is so adaptable to the neoliberal 
capitalist realism promoted by the fundamentally industrially oriented film policy of 
recent years), and a moving towards the politics of culture (policies informed by the 
regulative principle of a common culture in which participatory democracy is “the 
condition of which culture is the product”) (Eagleton 2000122).  
A fundamental re-orientation of policy ambitions on the left might be guided by 
contemporary forms of the “politics of the collectivity” (Gilbert 2006 192). The ideal 
of a common culture, in its demand for at least the possibility of general participation 
in the making of a culture, is closely related to the idea of a creative democracy and 
thereby converges with recent forms of the “anti-individualist politics of the 
common” which strike at the competitive individualism, authoritarianism and 
marketised reason of neoliberalism (2006 191). As Jeremy Gilbert argues, ‘creativity’ 
in this kind of politics is theorized as having an inherently social character, just as 
‘collectivity’ is increasingly seen as “inherently productive” (2006  192). This re-
articulation of the discourse of creativity (dislodging its limited and regressive ‘social 
market’ inflection within the CI model) helps us to get another view of the complexity 
of the apparent de-politicisation of a filmmaker like Meadows and to fortify those 
seeking to resist the ‘reality-generating power of market reasoning’ with its deadly 
insistence on its own inherent superiority over democratic political deliberation itself 
(McGuigan 2004: 43). 
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